The replicator dynamics of players choosing either mixed or pure strategies are usually regarded as equivalent, as long as strategies are played with identical frequencies. In this paper we show that a population of pure strategies can be invaded by mixed strategies in any two-player game with equilibrium coexistence upon the addition of an arbitrarily small amount of noise in the replication process. 
represented by a 2 × 2 payoff matrix. As the game is interactively played, individuals with larger payoffs will thrive with larger reproductive fitnesses while those with worse performances will eventually perish.
Recent experimental evidence (Kummerli et al.(2007) ) suggests that the iterated Snowdrift Dilemma (SD) (Doebeli & Hauert(2005) ) may be more suitable for explaining the high levels of cooperation observed among unrelated human individuals than the more intensively studied iterated Prisoners' Dilemma. In a SD each player can in each turn either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The cooperative behavior by at least one individual yields a benefit b to both players. If both individuals cooperate each one contributes c/2 to the total cost, otherwise the total cost c is payed by the cooperator alone. Mutual defection yields no benefit or cost to any player.
The replicator dynamics (Hofbauer & Sigmund(1998) ) for the evolutionary SD game yields a simple prediction. If there are only cooperators in the population, a defector will have the advantage and will invade. Similarly, in a population of defectors, a cooperator can also invade. A fixed point is reached when cooperators are observed with probability p C = 1 − c/(2b − c).
It is generally assumed that it makes no difference whether the population is composed by genes playing pure defective (D) or cooperative (C) strategies in a proportion defined by p C or by genes playing mixed strategies with probability of cooperating p C . Notice that a gene can play a mixed strategy either by creating individuals who play mixed strategies or by having a proportion of its carriers to behave as cooperators while the others behave as defectors. In other words an arbitrary population of pure strategists is thought to be stable against a population of mixed strategy players, given that the probability of cooperating is tunned to be p C .
In the following we will analyze the effect of a random drift on pure and mixed strategies playing games with equilibrium coexistence having the SD as a major example.
[ Fig. 1 Let us suppose a well-mixed population playing an evolutionary two-player game with strategies C and D and payoff matrix given by:
with a CC < a DC and a CD > a DD , implying strategies that coexist at equilibrium with cooperators at frequency:
Suppose this population to be composed of mixed strategists at frequency
x M playing C with probability p C , pure defectors and pure cooperators at frequencies x D and x C , respectively.
The replicator dynamics is given by (Nowak(2006) ):
where x a and f a are, respectively, the frequency and the payoff (or fitness)
of type a players andf = a x a f a is their mean fitness. Considering that
we can eliminate one of the three equations in (3) to write:
It can be easily verified that the dynamical system in (5) has a line of fixed
The linear stability of these fixed points can be studied by calculating the Jacobian matrix in the neighborhood of the line to find:
which has a stable eigen-direction v 1 = (1, −1) with eigenvalue λ 1 = −(a CD − a DD )x C and a degenerate eigen-direction v 0 = (1, (1 − p C )/p C ). As expected, this analysis reveals that a population composed by pure strategies at equilibrium and by mixed strategies is stable regardless of the frequency x M of mixed strategists.
In figure 1 we represent this general picture in a simplex with special attention to the fact that stable eigenvalues depend on x C .
[ Fig. 2 about here.]
To assess the behavior along the stable line we introduce a random perturba-
Let us now suppose that the replication of each and every one of the strategies is randomly influenced by global environmental changes. This may be represented by adding noise in the mapping of payoffs into fitnesses. To assess this scenario we replace the perturbation in (7) by a Wiener process as (2000)). We can then show that this component leads to a drift toward a population composed exclusively by mixed strategies (point figure 1 ). That can be seen by changing variables in (7) to write the following stochastic differential equation in Itô form:
where α = σp C (a CD − a DD ). We now consider an initial population with pure strategies and a positive, but very small, frequency of mixed strategies
x ≃ p C . Assuming very small fluctuations (σ very small), equation (8) yields the following approximation for the probability density for x:
that converges as t → ∞ to ρ ∞ (x) = δ(x), to say, to populations concentrated around x M = 1. In figure 2 we show a simulation for the replicator dynamics of the SD game with b = 4 and c = 2. The initial condition is set to be the evolutionary equilibrium with cooperators to be found at frequency p C and a single mixed strategy with probability p C of cooperating. As predicted, the population of pure strategies is led to extinction by mixed strategies.
The general picture that emerges can be described as follows. Suppose that the population has been brought to a rest point. From there, any change in the proportion of the mixed strategies that keeps the proportion of the pure strategies unaltered will not change the matching probabilities when the game is played and therefore, this will correspond to a perturbation along a stable eigen-direction, with no consequences other than the random change.
A different scenario is observed if the ratio of the pure strategies is somehow altered. When that happens, matching probabilities will change to a point near the rest point. And, while the mixed strategy is still playing the evolutionary equilibrium answer to the game, the pure strategies are no longer doing that.
This means that some of them might be better than average (those that have become rarer), while others will certainly be worse (the strategies that became more common). This will cause the system to move closer to the rest point, restoring the equilibrium, as expected in the basin of attraction. However, an important effect happens here. The mixed strategy was playing the best answer and therefore, its fitness becomes larger than the average until the equilibrium is restored, regardless of the direction of departure. This means that any time a drift that changes the relative proportions of pure strategies happens, the mixed strategy will increase its proportion. In the long run, it will slowly dominate the game and the drift will cause the extinction of all pure strategies.
We emphasize that the conclusion above holds for any game with equilibrium coexistence and we have used the SD case as an example. That means that any analysis of evolutionary processes or of the emergence of cooperation should also be performed without the supposition that strategies breed true.
In the long run, mixed strategies will have a higher probability of survival and this fact should be taken into consideration when evolutionary dynamics is considered. 
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